Introduction
Cross-border capital flows have been increasing in real value at a pace of about 6 percent a year since 1980, faster than those of world GDP and trade. The progress has been particularly rapid since 1990
(though with a temporary drop during [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] , and another probably temporary dip that started in 2008). This reflects falling barriers to capital flows in many parts of the world. Yet, the composition varies across countries. Many developing countries (e.g., China, Malaysia, and South Africa) are net importers of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the one hand, but net exporters of financial capital on the other.
Many developed countries (e.g., France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) do the reverse, exporting FDI but importing financial capital. 1 While there is a well-established literature on two-way flows within a subset of capital category such as portfolio investment motivated by a risk-sharing desire, and horizontal FDIs when gains of multinationals from selling locally more than offset the plant-specific fixed costs (e.g., Markusen, 2002; and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple, 2004) , two-way capital flows across the categories of financial capital and FDI have not received much attention in the literature.
This paper aims to propose a simple theoretical framework on institutions and capital flows. It unbundles institutions into property rights protection and financial system efficiency, and unbundles cross-border capital flows into FDI and financial capital. It explores potentially distinct roles of different domestic institutions in determining the structure of international capital flows.
To incorporate these features, we introduce a modified version of the financial contract model of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) to the neoclassical model. To highlight the role of institutions rather than risk sharing motive as a driver for capital flows, our model assumes that everyone is risk-neutral. What emerges from the model is a wedge between the expected marginal product of capital and the financial interest rate, and the wedge widens as the cost of financial intermediation or the cost of weak corporate governance increases. This relationship makes explicit the possibility that a developing country (with a scarcity of capital and a potentially high return to physical capital) may nonetheless offer a low return to financial investment/savings due to inefficiency of its financial sector and weakness of its corporate governance. The country may experience inward FDI, which is attracted by its high marginal product of capital. At the same time, it may export financial capital, due to its lower interest rate relative to the foreign country.
In a world free of any barriers to cross-border capital flows, financial capital and foreign direct investment not only move in opposite directions but also reinforce each other in a way that would lead to a complete 1 Yasheng Huang (2003) suggests that China's inward FDI is a reflection of its inability to allocate its household savings efficiently through its financial sector. FDI is often used by Chinese private firms to deal with financing difficulties. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2004) also suggest that multinational firms are part of the mechanism for a vast Chinese labor force to be employed successfully in export-oriented sectors without being dragged down by China's inefficient financial system.
The Literature and Some Data Patterns

Relations to the Existing Literature
Several recent theoretical papers on capital flows focus on the role of domestic financial development and therefore are related to our paper. Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008) show that an exogenously low capacity to generate financial assets in an exogenously fast-growing economy induces households in that country to demand savings instruments from a financially more advanced foreign country. Rather than modeling financial market deficiency by an inability to generate financial assets, we model it by a combination of low efficiency in the financial sector and weak corporate governance via Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) . Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2007) show that differences in domestic financial development could induce the financially most developed countries to accumulate net foreign liabilities while simultaneously accumulating positive positions in foreign risky assets (FDIs and equity investment).
The existence of production risks and risk aversion of the agents in the model are key to generating the composition of capital flows in that paper. In comparison, we shut down that channel by assuming risk neutrality in the model. The key driver for the two-way flows in our model is a wedge between returns to physical capital and financial interest rate generated by institutional weakness. In addition, we study distinct roles of property rights protection and financial development in determining the composition of capital flows, something the previous papers do not do.
Other recent papers also look into the composition of capital flows. Goldstein and Razin (2006) and Razin and Sadka (2007) use information asymmetry to highlight a trade-off between foreign direct investment and portfolio investment. Antras, Desai, and Foley (2009) relate the choice of a multinational firm between licensing a technology to foreign producers versus engaging in FDI to the strength of property rights protection in the host country. Giannetti and Koskinen (2009) study the effects of investor protection on stock prices and equity portfolio investment, and show generally that portfolio investors are more willing to invest abroad when the domestic regime of investor protection is weaker. These papers do not study twoway flows (of FDI and financial capital), do not investigate potentially distinct roles of different types of institutions, and do not generate the bypass effect of financial globalization that is emphasized in our paper. By incorporating a Heckscher-Ohlin production structure, Ju and Wei (2007b) and Jin (2008) study how a change in industrial structure could substitute for international capital flows. Neither paper studies the role of financial development or property rights protection in capital flows.
This paper is also related to the literature that investigates the implications of financial market imperfection on the direction of international capital flows. A seminal paper is Gertler and Rogoff (1990) which shows that a moral hazard problem between foreign investors and domestic entrepreneurs may cause capital to be exported by poor countries to rich ones (contrary to the frictionless neoclassical model). Other important papers include Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) which focuses on asymmetric information across countries as an explanation for differences in real interest rates, Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) which argues that better investor protection could generate a higher interest rate, Matsuyama (2004 Matsuyama ( , 2005 and Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2006) which study the effects of international credit market constraint on cross-country capital flows, and Stulz (2005) which studies the dual agency problems of government and entrepreneurs in limiting the extent of financial globalization. Unlike our paper, these papers do not unbundle institutions nor capital flows.
The comparative statics in our model indicates that as the quality of financial institution and corporate governance improves, one expects to see less financial capital outflow but more FDI outflow. Two recent empirical studies are of particular relevance for this paper. Kristin Forbes (2008) roles of property rights protection and financial development in the composition of capital flows. He finds that, conditional on the quality of property rights protection, more financial development tends to reduce inward FDI but increase gross inflows of financial capital. Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2006) find that aggregate capital appears to flow " upstream," i.e., from poor to rich countries, while FDI does go " downstream," from rich to poor countries. Desai and Dharmapala (2007) document that international investors appear to alter their portfolio choices to bypass home country tax regimes and weak host country investor protections.
Empirical Motivation
We provide some additional stylized facts as an empirical motivation for our theory. In particular, we document that it is not unusual for a country's net financial capital flows and net FDI to go in the opposite directions. Table 1 In Table 3 , we report simple regressions of net financial outflows and net FDI outflows on a country's quality of financial system and strength of property rights protection. It is interesting to see that the quality of the financial system appears to have very different effects on outbound FDI and outbound financial capital. In particular, a country with a better financial system (such as the United Kingdom or the United States) tends to export more net FDI but less net financial capital, while a country with a worse financial system (such as Vietnam or China) tends to do the opposite.
To summarize, there are some interesting patterns about institutions and capital flows. First, net FDI and net financial capital flows often move in the opposite directions. In particular, countries with both good financial development and good property rights protection tend to export FDI and import financial capital.
Countries with poor financial development but passable property rights protection tend to do the reverse.
Second, a higher level of financial development is associated with a decrease in the inflow of FDI (or an increase in the outflow of FDI) but an increase in the inflow of financial capital. The rest of the paper aims to provide a simple, micro-founded model that explains why these patterns might happen.
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To reduce the influence of a large populous country such as China and India, we scale the capital flows by log population in After the investment decision is made in the first period, production and consumption take place in the second period. Let the depreciation rate be zero. If the project succeeds, the gross return to one unit of capital, , and the wage rate, , are determined by
For each firm, if the project succeeds, the value of its gross output is equal to the total factor payment:
Thus, the firm earns zero profit. The gross return to one unit of investment , however, has to be sliced and shared among financial investors, the financial intermediary, and the entrepreneur. The CRS production function implies that the firm could borrow unlimited capital if the capital market were perfect. A moral hazard problem that we introduce next, however, results in credit rationing to the entrepreneur. We use a framework of moral hazard that is derived and simplified from Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) to parameterize financial sector efficiency. More precisely, entrepreneurs, whose own capital endowment is insufficient for the firm's financial need, obtain external financing indirectly through a financial intermediation sector from financial investors. Our main extension to the model of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) is to let the total return per unit of capital, , be endogenously determined by a country's characteristics of endowment and institution, which allows us to study international capital flows, whereas
Holmstrom and Tirole set as exogenously given. In addition, while Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) also study the investment by financial intermediaries, we don't. On the other hand, we let agents endowed with capital endogenously choose to be either a financial investor or an entrepreneur, but Holmstrom and
Tirole don't.
For a representative firm, the final output depends in part on the entrepreneur's level of effort, which can be low or high, but is not observable by the financial investors or the financial institution. Assume that the entrepreneur can choose among two versions of the project. The "Good" version has a high probability of success,
, while offering no private benefit. The "Bad" version has a lower probability of success, , but offering a private benefit per unit of capital managed, , to the entrepreneur. Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), we further assume that only the "Good" project is economically viable. That is, 1 + > 0 > 1 + + so that only the "Good" project is implemented in the moral hazard problem.
We use to denote a country's level of property rights protection, where 1
could be understood as a tax rate on the capital returns, where taxation is broadly defined to include state expropriation. We normalize = 0 and define = thereafter. Since we fix , without loss of generality, we can conveniently refer to directly as an index of property rights protection.
The entrepreneur is paid per unit of capital to induce her to choose the "Good" project. In addition to that, we assume that / units of good (but no capital and labor) are used to intermediate one unit of investment. Thus, the pay to the financial intermediation is / units of good per unit of investment. / may represent the transaction cost, the monitoring cost to reduce the extent of moral hazard, or the expropriation by government officials. The efficiency level of the financial system in the country is then represented by . The higher the , the lower is the financial intermediation cost. In the moral hazard model developed in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) , the financial intermediation is to monitor the entrepreneur not to select the bad project. In this sense, financial intermediation and corporate governance are connected. For simplicity, we assume / and to be independent. However, if we assume a more general form of financial intermediation costs, consisting of a part proportional to , and another part equal to / , the results in later sections will stay the same.
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Conditional on the efficiency level of the financial system, the entrepreneur chooses the amount of external capital , her own capital contribution to the project , total investment of the project , and the marginal pay to the entrepreneur's effort to solve the following program:
The objective function (3) represents the entrepreneur's expected income. The first term represents the entrepreneur's share in total capital revenue. The second term is the return from investing her own 1 capital in the market. Turning into the constraints, inequality (4) requires that entrepreneur's internal capital is less than her capital endowment. Inequality (5) requires that total investment does not exceed the sum of internal and external capitals. Inequality (6) is the participation constraint for the outside financial investors, 4 while inequality (7) is the entrepreneur's incentive compatibility constraint.
It is then straightforward to show that all constraints must be binding in equilibrium. 5 The entrepreneur will invest all her endowment = 1 in the firm. The total investment equals the sum of internal and external capitals + 1. The incentive compatibility constraint (7) gives
= (8)
Substituting (8) into (6) gives the firm's optimal investment
Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) , it is assumed that financial intermediaries monitor the entire project to ensure entrepreneurs behave. Thus, the intermediation cost is proportional to the amount of total capital, not just external capital.
5
The problem is solved by setting the Lagrangian. The marginal return to internal capital must be higher than the financial interest rate as the entrepreneur needs to pay an entry cost (to be specified later). Then straightforward manipulation of the first order conditions shows that (4), (5), (6), and (7) must bind.
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Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) , we rule out the case that 1 + + / + < 0 in which the firm would want to invest without limit.
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Substituting (8) and (9) into (3), the entrepreneur's expected income becomes
A Sharing Rule on Return to Physical Capital
We assume that a capitalist (a potential entrepreneur) needs to pay a fixed entry cost of units of goods to become an entrepreneur. With free entry and exit of entrepreneurs, an entrepreneur's expected income net of the entry cost , (1 + ) , should be equal to (1 + ) so that capitalists are indifferent between becoming entrepreneurs or financial investors in equilibrium. 7 That is,
Using ( (1 + ) = (1 + ) , is the net pay to the entrepreneur per unit of investment.
The equation (12) is a key expression in this model, as it describes how the expected return to the physical capital is divided up among its usages, which we label as a capital revenue sharing rule (CRSR).
The expected marginal product of capital on the left hand side of the equation, is shared by the return to 7
For expositional convenience, we assume that the entrepreneur borrows in the first period an amount equal to from a financier and repays it in the second period. If instead, the fixed cost was paid out of the entrepreneur's own capital endowment in the first period, the right hand side of constraint (4) would become 1 , and the optimal investment (9) would be reduced to (1 ) . However, condition (12) would still hold with being replaced by , and all of our results in later sections would not be affected. Furthermore, if were due only in the second period, condition (12) would become = 1 + + + /(1 + + ), and our results would still remain qualitatively under some conditions.
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financial investment, 1 + , the cost of financial intermediation, , and the net pay to the entrepreneur per unit of investment . The lower the efficiency of the financial sector (as reflected by a higher or a lower ), or the poorer the corporate governance (as reflected by a higher ), the lower is the return to financial investment in the economy. In other words, in spite of a scarcity of capital in a developing country (which normally implies a high return to physical capital), the return on savings and other financial investment may very well be low if the country's financial sector is inefficient or the corporate governance is weak.
Capital Flows
Consider capital flows between countries and . 8 Countries differ in the efficiency level of their financial system, , the strength of property rights protection, , the agency cost (private benefit), , the entry cost for entrepreneurs, , and endowments and . For ease of keeping track, let us make country have low financial sector efficiency and weak corporate governance, i.e., a typical developing country. There are two types of international capital flows in this model. Foreign direct investment (FDI) goes to where the expected return to an entrepreneur is the highest. It takes place when the entrepreneur decides to take her project (and the capital under her management) to a foreign country and use foreign labor to produce. Financial capital goes where the interest rate is the highest. Labor is assumed to be immobile across countries.
We proceed sequentially. First, we let costs of capital flows be increasing and convex, and show that an interior solution exists in the equilibrium, which features an incomplete bypass of inferior domestic institutions. Second, we present a special case without frictions, and show a complete bypass as the unique corner solution.
Patterns of capital flows generally change in response to changes in the quality of institutions and factor endowments in the two countries. To make the presentation easier to follow, we first analyze the case that financial capital flows from to , while FDI flows from to . The determinants of patterns of capital flows will then be studied at the end of section 4.3.
Financial Capital Flows with Convex Costs
Let 0 ( 0 ) be the capital stock in country ( ), respectively, before any cross-border capital flows. Let and be the capital stocks in two countries after the capital flows. Let be the amount of Investors receive the financial return (interest rate) from the country where they invest. We assume that free trade in goods equalizes the price of the good between the countries, which is normalized to 1. In equilibrium we must have ( ) = .
Using (1) and CRSR (12), we obtain the equilibrium
is the sum of the cost of financial intermediation and the net pay to the entrepreneur per unit of investment, and is referred to as the collective agency costs. A higher represents a lower collective quality of financial institution and corporate governance in country .
Foreign Direct Investment with Convex Costs
Consider an entrepreneur from country who invests directly in country . She uses fraction of her capital endowment (i.e., one unit) to raise external financing in country , , and uses the remaining 1 fraction of her endowment to raise external financing in country , . She is assumed to have to deal with the local financial institutions in the country that provides the funding. That is, the entrepreneur pays the local financial interest rate and the local cost of financial intermediation, and receives the local private benefit for the two parts of financing, respectively. 9 The entrepreneur then chooses to maximize her expected income. In equilibrium, the entrepreneur's marginal expected returns from raising external finance in the two countries must be equal. Furthermore, in an interior solution, the entrepreneur's expected income in the FDI project must be equal to the expected income if she operates the project at home. In such an equilibrium, some entrepreneurs in country engage in FDI projects in the foreign country while others stay at home.
Let be the amount of FDI outflow in country , and ( ) represent the marginal cost of FDI from to , which is increasing in the volume of FDI by assumption. For simplicity, we assume that there are no fixed costs in FDI. In Appendix 1, we show that the equilibrium condition for FDI from to is: 9 Giannetti and Koskinen (2009) assume that foreign controlling shareholders prefer to invest in a weak investor protection country to enjoy higher private benefits. We modify their assumption by letting the entrepreneur to receive the local private benefit only for the part of the external financing that is raised locally. 
The equilibrium amount of financial capital flow from country to ,
, and the equilibrium amount of FDI from to , (or ) are obtained by solving the system (13) and (14), together with two conditions that the net capital outflow must be equal to the difference in the amounts of the domestic capital stock before and after the capital flows:
Comparative Statics with Costly Capital Flows
We will perform comparative statics by varying the quality of the institutions in country i, while holding constant the institutional quality and the factor endowment in the other country. Substituting equations (15) and (16) into equilibrium conditions (13) and (14), and totally differentiating them with respect to , and 0 , we obtain: Let us explain these results in words and with intuition. First, an improvement in a typical developing country's quality of financial institutions (or a reduction in , through either better corporate governance or a lower cost of financial intermediation) tends to simultaneously reduce its financial capital outflow and FDI inflow. While a reduction in does not directly affect the expected marginal product of capital in conditions (13) and (14), it leads to a higher financial interest rate. As a result, there is less incentive for financial capital to leave the country. As more financial capital stays with local firms, the expected marginal product of capital declines, which makes it less attractive for inward FDI. Second, in comparison, an improvement in property rights protection in a developing country tends to reduce its financial capital outflow but increase FDI inflow. To see this, we note that there are a direct effect and an indirect effect following an improvement in property rights protection. The direct effect is a rise in the marginal product of capital (which attracts more inward FDI), and a rise in the domestic financial interest rate (which reduces financial capital outflows). There is also an indirect effect: with more financial capital staying at home, the marginal product of capital would decline, which would make it less attractive for inward FDI. However, as
Appendix 2 shows rigorously, under the assumption of convex costs of capital flows, the direct effect dominates the indirect effect unambiguously.
To summarize, an improvement in the financial sector efficiency and an improvement in property rights protection could have different effects on the directions and the composition of capital flows. This is partially borne out in Table 3 . In particular, better financial development appears to have opposite effects on FDI and financial capital flows across countries. This is in line with the theoretical predictions. On the other hand, the effects of better property rights protection are more elusive empirically. While the coefficient on property rights protection in the net FDI regression is consistent with the theoretical prediction but not statistically significant, the corresponding coefficient in the financial capital outflow regression is not consistent with the theory.
If financial capital flows into country , the condition (13) becomes
If FDI flows out of country , the condition (14) becomes
In the case that both financial capital and FDI flow out of (into) country , or the case that financial capital flows in but FDI flows out, we all obtain that > 0, < 0, < 0, < 0, 0 > 0, and 0 > 0 by a similar analysis. We can summarize the results by the following proposition: The general relationship between institutions and capital flows is summarized by Figure 1 . Note that the model can be extended to a multiple-country world in a tractable way. If we assume that the costs of capital flows from country to country , ( ) and ( ), are increasing in the volume of capital flows, the returns to capital flows (for either FDI or financial capital) to all other countries must be equal in equilibrium. We can solve a system similar to (13) and (14) for the world equilibrium.
Capital Flows with No Frictions
The previous analysis assumes an increasing and convex cost for capital flows. If instead the cost of capital flows is zero or linear, the determinant of the 2 × 2 matrix on the left hand side of equations (17) and (18) It is worth noting that the complete-bypass equilibrium is independent from initial endowment allocation 
We define country as effectively capital abundant if condition (24) holds. Country is a net exporter of capital if and only if the country is effectively capital abundant. Note that even if country is poor ( 0 < 0 ), it can be effectively capital abundant if it has sufficiently weak property rights protection ( < ).
To summarize we have:
Proposition 2 (A) In a frictionless world capital market, the unique equilibrium of capital flows features a complete bypass: all capital originally in the country with lower quality of financial institutions leaves the country in the form of financial capital outflow, but domestic investment takes place in the form of FDI. (B) Less FDI goes into a country with worse property rights protection. (C) A country is a net exporter of capital if and only if it is effectively capital abundant.
The discussion assumes an exogenous capital endowment. This is not crucial for our story. In Appendix 4, we present an overlapping-generations (OLS) model in which the capital stock in a period is the result of an endogenous savings decision in the previous period. We show that the boundary conditions for financial capital flows (21) and for FDI (22) . Using proposition 2, the wage rate in an open economy is higher than that in a autarky if and only if the country is a net importer of capital (i.e., when it is effectively labor abundant).
Welfare Impact of Capital Flows
Does financial globalization enhance welfare for individual economies and for the world as a whole? This is the subject of this section. We measure a change in social welfare by the occurrence of a potential Pareto improvement, which in turn can be represented by a change in aggregate income. For simplicity, we will focus on the case of a frictionless world. A key result is that the welfare effect may diverge between financially sophisticated and financially backward economies. 
where we have used the result that = 1 + / , and equations (2) and (12), for the above derivations. Thus, with the depreciation rate set at zero, the aggregate income equals the sum of total output produced and capital left at the end of period 2.
Let us use superscripts 0 and 1 to denote variables before and after free capital mobility, respectively. One can see that the first order condition of the above optimization problem is exactly the same as (23).
Therefore, determined by condition (23) maximizes the expected world aggregate income. One can also check that the world aggregate income with free capital flows equals
. As long as 0 differs from so that the net capital flow is not zero, the world as a whole must strictly benefit from free capital flows as the efficiency of global capital allocation improves.
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As in a leading graduate-level textbook for international macroeconomics (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996, Chapter 1), the capital stock is eaten after date 2 production. Thus welfare is measured by the sum of the second-period GNP and the capital stock.
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To put it differently, financial globalization in this case is a substitute for reforms of weak domestic financial institutions/corporate governance in developing countries. As the inferior financial system is completely bypassed by saving and investment, return on savings becomes higher, and capital mobility equates the expected marginal products of capital across all countries.
National Welfare
Unlike the world welfare, national welfare may not be higher with financial globalization for every individual economy. To be precise, we will show that the country with a strong financial institution/corporate governance always benefits from free capital mobility. However, the country with a weak financial system/corporate governance may lose out. For the latter country, the strength of its property rights protection also plays a role in determining how likely it is to benefit from financial globalization.
To see the intuition, recall from the capital revenue sharing rule (12) that the expected marginal product of capital has to be distributed among financial investors, financial intermediaries, and entrepreneurs. Free international capital flows and the resulting bypass of the inefficient financial system transfers the revenue of financial intermediation and of management from country (the one with a weak financial system) to (the one with a strong financial system). The welfare impact on country , therefore, is determined by the trade-off between an efficiency gain from capital mobility and a revenue loss in financial intermediation and entrepreneurial pay.
The Country with a Weak Financial Sector
The expected aggregate income in country in financial autarky is:
With free capital movement, all 0 are intermediated through the foreign financial system. Suppose is the amount of FDI that enters country from . Note that the interest rates are equalized across countries with free capital mobility, The change in national welfare in country is given by
The first term in the squared bracket in (29), denoted by , represents the standard triangle gain from free capital flows in the neoclassical theory. More precisely,
The second term on the right hand side of equality (29), denoted by , represents country 's revenue loss from a complete bypass.
The welfare effect can be illustrated graphically. In Figure 3 , the vertical axis represents the expected marginal product of capital, while the horizontal axis represents the amount of capital. Expression (30) . As an example, if 0 = so that the net capital flows happen to be zero with financial globalization (but the gross capital flows could be massive), then = 0 and = 0 . In this example, free capital mobility is guaranteed to reduce the welfare of country .
As indicated in Figure 3 , the magnitude of the triangle gain from capital flows, , is determined by the size of net capital flow, 0 . Let country be effectively labor abundant. Using (23), we can show that 0 becomes larger when (property rights protection) is larger. Therefore, the country with a weak financial system is more likely to benefit from free capital mobility if its property rights protection is stronger. 
The Country with a Strong Financial Sector
We turn now to country -the one with a strong financial system. Similar to the above analysis, 
The first term in the right hand side of (31) is again the triangle gain from capital flows, which is always positive. The second term is the revenue transferred to country from country due to the bypass effect.
In contrast to the previous case, the second term is also positive. Therefore, the country with the good financial system/corporate governance must benefit from global capital mobility. To summarize we have: unambiguously from capital account openness, while country could lose. Therefore, the central conclusion in the proposition still holds qualitatively.
These theoretical predictions are consistent with the observation that advanced countries like the United States tend to be more enthusiastic about pushing for capital account openness around the world than many developing countries. Furthermore, they are consistent with the empirical findings, reviewed in 2010) , that not all developing countries benefit from financial globalization, and that those developing countries with strong property rights protection are more likely to benefit from it. In addition, the model is consistent with the idea that it is better to liberalize FDI inflows than financial capital outflows.
Conclusions
Financial capital and FDI, on net, often go in the opposite directions. Developed countries with an efficient financial system, strong corporate governance, and strong property rights protection are often net exporters of FDI but net importers of financial capital. Emerging market economies with an inefficient financial system, weak corporate governance but an intermediate level of property rights protection tend to exhibit an opposite pattern, exporting financial capital, but importing FDI on net. If the difference in the quality of financial system/corporate governance between the two sets of countries is sufficiently large (relative to the costs of cross-border capital flows), the theory developed in this paper suggests that the inferior financial system/corporate governance can be bypassed by two-way capital flows. In a sense, financial globalization is a substitute for domestic financial reforms as capital can be put to the most efficient use in this case even without domestic reforms. However, the net welfare effect on a developing country with a weak financial system may not always be positive, if the fees paid for financial intermediation and business entry have a rent component. While the welfare effect for a developing country may be ambiguous, the model suggests that the net effect is more likely to be positive, the stronger is property rights protection.
Unlike the neoclassical theory that equates the expected marginal product of capital to the interest rate, the sharing rule on capital revenue derived in this paper states that the expected marginal product of capital is the sum of the interest rate, the cost of financial intermediation, and the cost of weak corporate governance. In other words, the weaker the financial system or the corporate governance in a country, the greater the gap between the interest rate and the expected marginal product of capital. Also, while risk sharing is an explanation in the literature for two-way portfolio capital flows across countries, this paper provides a new explanation based on differences in institutional quality (even with risk neutral investors).
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This simple model is a first step towards a framework for understanding the composition of international capital flows and its connection with domestic institutions. There are still many areas in which the model can be enriched. First, while the current analysis groups quality of financial system and quality of corporate governance together, future work could investigate their separate implications. For example, if one allows for international direct investment in the banking sector, then the efficiency of a developing country's banking sector (though not the strength of its corporate governance) may be improved partially.
If one introduces joint venture between foreign and local entrepreneurs, perhaps the quality of local corporate governance can be partially modified as well. Second, while the current model lumps together international portfolio equity and portfolio debt flows under the rubric of financial capital, it would be useful to separate them. Third, the quality of domestic financial sector and the efficiency of corporate governance are two parameters in the current model. It would be useful to endogenize them, and in particular, to discuss ways in which they may respond to global capital flows. Fourth, the optimal sequence of capital market liberalization could be studied. Fifth, a systematic empirical investigation can be conducted to examine whether and how financial institutions and property rights protection may affect patterns of international flows differently. These could be fruitful directions for future research. 
If > , the entrepreneur finances the entire project in the host country ( = 1), while if < , the entrepreneur finances the entire project at home ( = 0). To make the discussion interesting, we rule out the case of = 1 (by imposing some conditions on the parameters). In other words, at least some financing is raised at home.
If the entrepreneur operates at home, her expected income
In an equilibrium with interior solution, Totally differentiating equations (13) and (14) , to the system. It is then straightforward to show that > 0, < 0, < 0, < 0, 0 > 0, and 0 > 0. In words, as a (developing) country's financial institutions improves ( decreases), it tends to experience both less financial capital outflows and less FDI inflows. As a country's property rights institutions strengthen ( increases), it tends to experience less financial capital outflows but more FDI inflows. Finally, as a country's capital-to-labor ratio increases, it tends to export more of both financial capital and FDI.
Note that the existence of the interior solution relies on the assumption of convex costs of capital flows. If the costs of capital flows are linear (or zero), equals zero and a corner solution occurs.
There are 97 countries in total for which we can have these measures and have data on their patterns of capital flows. Based on these measures, the entire sample is divided into three approximately equal-sized bins:
Bin 1 (good collective quality of financial system and corporate governance, and good property rights protection) = all countries with the ratings of the collective quality of financial institutions and corporate governance in the top 33 percentile. These countries also happen to have good property rights institutions. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Finland are examples of countries in this bin.
The remaining 2/3 of the countries are divided based on whether their rating of property rights protection is above or below the median of the remaining set (2/3) of the countries.
Bin 2 (bad collective quality of financial system and corporate governance, and intermediate property rights protection) = the half of the countries not in Bin 1 that have ratings of property rights protection above the median value of the remaining 2/3 of the countries. China, Vietnam, and Mexico are some examples in this second bin.
Bin 3 (bad collective quality of financial system and corporate governance, and bad property rights protection) = the half of the countries not in Bin 1 that have ratings of property rights protection below the median value of the remaining 2/3 of the countries. Haiti, Angola, and
Ukraine are examples of countries in this third bin.
Capital Flows
Sources: We extract the stock of foreign assets and liabilities (in millions US dollars) in 2003 from "the Wealth of Nations, Mark II" , by Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2006) . The data on population (in millions) come from the IMF's International Financial Statistics.
To minimize possible bias induced by the disparity in population counts across countries, we compute net (53)
We now use +1 0 and +1 0 to denote capital owned by countries and , respectively. Conditions (48) and (49) state that the savings in period are equal to the capital owned by countries in period + 1.
Equation (50) is the capital revenue sharing rule (12) in country . (Note that the financial system in country also serves the financial investors in country . ) Equation (51) represents the equilibrium FDI condition similar to (23); as investors in both countries are served by the same financial system, the expected marginal products of capital in two countries are equalized. Finally, equations (52) and (53) determine the wage rates in countries and , respectively. These six equations solve for six endogenous variables, +1 0 , +1 0 , +1 , +1 , +1 , and +1 . Two results are worth noting: First, the complete bypass result still holds in the steady state. Second, the steady state level of wage rate in country , +1 , is determined by the amount of FDI flowing into the country, +1 . Using proposition 2, the wage rate in the open economy is higher than that in the autarky if and only if the country is a net importer of capital (i.e., it is effectively labor abundant).
